The current state of Ukrainian society is characterized by an unprecedented level of psychological and emotional exhaustion, which is a direct consequence of war, economic turbulence, and continuous existential stress. As of the first half of 2026, under conditions of the prolonged operation of the legal regime of martial law and general mobilization, a dangerous dynamic is being observed: the transformation of latent social discontent into open radicalization. 

This process is not exclusively spontaneous; to a significant extent, it is catalyzed, scaled, and directed through targeted information-psychological special operations (IPSO) conducted by the Russian Federation. For a deeper understanding of these destructive processes, the analytical OSINT module KRONOS dynamics “TRASER” was applied, enabling in-depth monitoring of digital traces, identification of radicalization patterns, and assessment of the real level of threats to the state’s internal stability.

TRASER SYSTEM (Threat Monitoring) is an automated OSINT platform of KRONOS for monitoring and analyzing threats, detecting radicalization, IPSO, and subversive activity in the information space. The system uses artificial intelligence to filter, classify, and assess the threat level.

Identified:

  • IPSO (various modifications): the main share of detections (more than 1,500 individual cases across different classification variants, including hostile IPSO, IPSO agents, disinformation, etc.).
  • Passive intelligence and data collection (including BDA — Battle Damage Assessment): more than 600 cases.
  • Calls for violence and terrorism: in total, more than 700 cases (including calls for killings, terrorist attacks, and the radicalization of society).
  • 17,577 unique identifiers.

Sociological studies conducted in the first half of 2026 record alarming structural shifts in public consciousness. In particular, the issue of war and peace demonstrates sharp polarization: about 50% of citizens are categorically opposed to any concessions to the aggressor state, while a significant share — 39% — already declares readiness to accept certain compromises in order to end the armed confrontation. 

Optimism regarding a rapid end to the war has suffered devastating degradation. According to the data, only 10% of respondents retained faith that the war would end by the end of 2026, 16% predicted a resolution in the first half of 2026, while 29% look to 2027 and beyond. Critically important is the fact that 33% of the population have altogether lost the ability or willingness to make any forecasts, which in sociology is a marker of deep social apathy that can instantly transform into uncontrolled aggression when triggering events occur.

The public’s attitude toward everyday crises, such as power outages, is indicative. Although 54% of Ukrainians rationally blame Russian missile strikes, a significant share — 31% — blames blackouts exclusively on insufficient preparedness by the Ukrainian authorities, and another 7% blame insufficient assistance from the collective West. 

This indicates that frustration is beginning to seek an internal enemy that is more accessible and vulnerable to criticism than the external aggressor.

Institutional crisis of trust as a foundation for destabilization

The most critical indicator forming the basis for internal destabilization and the deployment of hostile IPSO is the total crisis of trust in key state institutions. Sociological measurements record a colossal cognitive dissonance in society’s perception of different elements of the state apparatus.

Institution / Vector Trust level (%) Distrust level (%) Dynamics vector (2024-2026)
Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) 94% Less than 5% Consistently high
Territorial Recruitment and Social Support Centers (TRCs) 24% 68% Negative (decline from 27% to 24%)
Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine 19% 76% Consistently critical
Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine 28% 30% Negative / Uncertain (42%)

The sacralization of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, trusted by 94% of citizens, stands in sharp contrast to the total demonization of the structures that ensure the staffing of those same Armed Forces.

This gap creates ideal conditions for information sabotage: hostile actors can attack the state apparatus, law enforcement agencies, and mobilization structures while hiding behind the rhetoric of “protecting real soldiers” from the “corrupt authorities.” This legitimizes aggression in the eyes of the average citizen, since it is presented under the guise of a struggle for justice. Analysis of TRASER OSINT module data shows precisely how this sociological vulnerability is exploited in practice to radicalize society.

Active IPSO

The data array obtained through the TRASER module represents a deep cross-section of digital activity. The key vector of active IPSO by the Russian Federation is a targeted, massive, and continuous campaign to discredit Territorial Recruitment and Social Support Centers (TRCs) and law enforcement agencies of Ukraine. The goal of this campaign is not merely to reduce trust in institutions, but to provoke permanent, violent conflicts between civilians and military personnel, thereby paralyzing the mobilization process.

To achieve this goal, harsh dehumanizing lexicon is used, intended to dehumanize state employees and turn them, in public consciousness, into a legitimate target for destruction. The actors systematically introduce into public discourse such terms as “human hunters,” “titushky,” “policemen,” “OZU” (organized criminal groups), “fascists,” and “wardens.”

For example, a user under the nickname Lyudmila (ID: 5973777***) systematically spreads a narrative that inverts reality: “TRC is the ‘titushky’ of the central committee and the powers that be… Policemen and TRC are fighting against the people 🇺🇦”. This thesis is a classic technique of reflexive control, in which defenders of the state are equated with occupiers. The actor Nata (ID: 1029276***) reacts to a video of a man’s detention with the thesis: “An organized criminal group, covered by the authorities!!!!!”. Another subject, Irina (ID: 1375272***), uses an entire spectrum of emotionally charged labels: “green inhumans, titushky and human hunters, the first fat draft dodgers.”

Comparing Ukrainian state officials with collaborators from the Second World War is another widespread IPSO method. The user Irina rhetorically asks: “Interesting, were the policemen tired back then too?”, while the actor Bald fox shearing (ID: 704702***) states unequivocally: “TRC is a neo-Nazi organization.” Such semantic coding has deep sociological significance: if the TRC are “policemen” and “Nazis,” then physical resistance to them is not a criminal offense, but a moral duty, a heroic act of partisan struggle.

This dehumanization is reinforced by the spread of emotionally shocking, often unverified or entirely fabricated stories about torture. The user @AnQlaw spreads the story: “after contact with the TRC he fell into a coma, tortured for 3 days in the TRC basement…”. Such messages create the effect of “moral panic,” forcing society to act irrationally and aggressively. The actor AV (ID: 5874643***) scales this narrative to the entire command structure: “more than half of brigade commanders and battalion commanders are sadists and schizophrenics… killing and maiming people in the TRC is normal.” As a result of such massive processing, Ukrainian society is artificially divided into the “common people” and the “repressive caste,” which is a fundamental precondition for internal civil conflict.

Direct threats and normalization of extremism

The most threatening trend identified by the TRASER module is the mass shift from passive discontent to the articulation of direct threats. A significant portion of digital content generated by radicalized users consists of open calls for killings and physical reprisals (shootings, stabbings, hangings) against government representatives, military personnel, police officers, and public figures.

Analysis of the database demonstrates the striking detail and cruelty of these calls, indicating a profound psychological transformation of individuals for whom violence has become an acceptable instrument for resolving social contradictions.

Nickname / ID Threat level Quote / Nature of threat Sociological assessment
Orest (ID: 5120122***) 9 “If police thugs or TRC come to my house, I’ll take them down the same way… they will be shot in groups of 15” Legitimization of mass shootings of state officials; creation of virtual “death squads.”
@Ratel77777 (ID: 606455***) 10 “why is there no blood feud why should they not lie in a ditch in this lawlessness with a knife in the back or a bullet in the head” Call for partisan warfare, terrorism, and the use of criminal methods (“blood feud”).
Rio (ID: 5284845***) 8 “I would have stuck a knife in the back of at least one of them” Direct declaration of intent to attempt murder with a bladed weapon.
@mo3raHety (ID: 423644***) 9 “Scum, f@cking shoot them on the spot….” Incitement to vigilantism and extrajudicial executions without investigation or trial.
Alexey (ID: 5274016***) 8 “F@ggots, you have to answer for the chevron!!! you will answer!!!… you will still die!!! this is the real truth!!!” Aggression directed specifically at a military symbol (chevron), indicating a degradation of respect for the army.
1 (ID: 8524303***) 9 “With what pleasure I would kill that scum on that roof, and most importantly everything at hand, a hammer, a crowbar.” Sadistic fantasies, detailing murder weapons, indicating a high likelihood of transition to real action.

This rhetoric is not limited to abstract curses. It contains calls for concrete terrorist acts. The actor under the nickname @dansky_ua (ID: 629829***, threat level 10) openly discusses the use of modern means of destruction against Ukrainians: “Again somewhere an FPV drone is crying, on this @sshole…”. Another subject, 🤠 (ID: 5170809***), claims to possess illegal automatic weapons: “I have a PPSh! Go f@ck yourself, scum!” in response to mobilization news.

A separate, extremely dangerous phenomenon is the glorification and heroization of individuals who have already committed crimes against representatives of the authorities. When news appears in the information space about knife attacks on TRC employees (as happened in Bukovyna or Odesa region) or the use of explosive devices (a grenade in Bila Tserkva), the comments explode with support. Users such as Vladimir (ID: 5532736***) write: “Respect to the man, and I hope the f@ggots died.” The user @nikita17april reacts to the news of a draft dodger’s knife attack: “And in my opinion, f@cking awesome)”, while the subject under the nickname O.P. (ID: 1083783***) puts a “👍” on the news about the thrown grenade.

This phenomenon, known in the sociology of deviant behavior as “stochastic terrorism,” consists in the use of mass communications to demonize a certain group to such an extent that dispersed, unrelated individuals are inspired to commit acts of violence against it. Support for violence in comments serves as social approval for potential offenders, lowering their psychological barrier to murder. A society in which a significant share of citizens is ready to applaud the killing of a state official is in a state of latent civil war.

Antisemitic and xenophobic narratives

Russian IPSO deeply analyze the vulnerable points of Ukrainian society, using historical trauma, ethnic stereotypes, and demographic fears to create irreparable fractures within the country. In the comments recorded by the TRASER system, systematic use of hate speech is observed, based on antisemitic conspiracy theories and harsh migrantophobia (xenophobia toward various national groups).

Exploiting the fact that the President of Ukraine and some other senior officials are of Jewish origin, hostile propaganda has launched a massive antisemitic campaign. The goal of this campaign is to convince Ukrainians that the war is not the result of Russian aggression, but a conspiracy of the “world Jewry” aimed at destroying the Ukrainian (“Slavic”) ethnos.

The actor under the nickname /\ (ID: 7983882***) is a vivid example of a transmitter of this ideology. He posts messages such as: “Operation ANTISEMIT! This is how the leadership of Ukraine, which is 100% made up of Jews, destroys the Ukrainian people in the most vile and cruel way… Jews are great, they made the ANTISEMIT topic so that Ukrainians could not open their mouths… Cynically and demonstratively, they are carrying out the total destruction of the indigenous population of Ukraine!!!”.3

This narrative resonates with the radicalized part of society. The user Oleg (ID: 5019142898) states directly: “Also remove the @FAGS and everything will fall into place.” The user Ivan (ID: 2033309***) uses homophobic-antisemitic insults: “In a Jewish wrapper!)”, while the actor Alexander (ID: 7535091***) calls for violence: “And when will they start throwing Jews like that?”. The destructiveness of this method lies in the fact that it channels anger from real problems (war, the economy) toward an artificially created internal enemy, destroying Ukraine’s international image and internal cohesion. Conspiracy constructs such as the “rule of usurers” (@Ratel77777) or claims about a “New Israel instead of Ukraine” (Borys, ID: 5868771***) are intended to deprive the war of meaning in the eyes of citizens, because according to this pathological logic, by defending the state they are supposedly helping their “oppressors.”

Xenophobia and migrantophobia

Under conditions of an objective demographic crisis in Ukraine, population outflow abroad, and losses at the front, discussion of the need to attract foreign workers (in particular, from Asian or African countries) has become a catalyst for a powerful xenophobic IPSO. Hostile propaganda has skillfully combined mobilization with fear of migrants, creating the narrative that: “Ukrainian men are deliberately being destroyed at the front in order to hand the country over to foreigners.”

This narrative provokes an acute emotional reaction. The user Znachit tak! (ID: 6589532***) reacts to news about migrant construction workers with extreme aggression: “they are knocking us out at the front so that migrants can be brought in. For us Ukrainians, this is not just a painful issue, it is a red line!”. Other users resort to outright racism. The actor Valentina writes: “Wait, and you’ll see how the @blackasses will boost your economy…”, while the user Gennady adds: “Soon we’ll be kissing black people in the ass.”

The subject @TorTor7171 articulates the ultimate goal of this IPSO — refusal to defend the state: “What is the point of fighting for this state if in the end all sorts of riffraff from India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh will live here?”. The actor Taras supplements this with contempt: “We already have enough of our own vatniks and draft dodgers, let’s bring in Indian vatniks.” Through such messages, Russia seeks to convince Ukrainians that victory in the war will bring them nothing good, since their national identity will still be destroyed by migrants. This is a classic instrument of division aimed at ultra-right and conservative segments of society.

Attempts at destabilization

To achieve maximum destructive effect, the Russian Federation’s information operations focus on hyperbolizing and manipulating real problems that hurt Ukrainians the most. The TRASER database classifies these destabilization attempts as aimed at sowing total panic, existential despair, and absolute distrust of any state decisions.

1. The thesis of “war as business” and accusations of corruption

Corruption scandals in Ukraine are the most powerful fuel for hostile IPSO. They are used not to demand reforms, but to prove the “meaninglessness” of resistance. The actor @ozerov_vv writes: “Another confirmation that this is not war, but business. And all these mugs just want to profit from killings and death.”. The user Olha (ID: 6746003***) calls for vigilantism: “Why not introduce the death penalty during wartime, just as soon as money is found somewhere, execute them immediately.”

The narrative of a “deal” is also actively promoted. The subject @Brom760 (ID: 912543***) claims: “Ukraine allows Russia to sell its oil and finance the war against itself. Nothing unusual, just a deal.”. This thesis destroys faith in the sincerity of the military-political leadership’s intentions, creating the illusion that the elites of both countries have conspired against ordinary people.

2. Manipulation of losses and demoralization of the front

Hostile propaganda actively uses the topic of human losses to spread defeatism. Ukraine is portrayed as a “concentration camp” where people are used as “cannon fodder.” The user @oksana_nosikova hysterically states: “We need to end the war!!! Maybe enough killing Ukrainians?? The genocide of Ukrainians is very pleasing to someone.. they made a concentration camp..”. The actor @miklosh_miko sums up this narrative: “And what is the problem, stop the war, everyone will return home alive and well!! Otherwise, until the last Ukrainian😢”.

To discredit the army itself, manipulations with prisoner exchanges and assessments of combat operations are used. For example, the actor Oksana (ID: 6052061***) cynically calls the prisoner exchange “supplying cannon fodder for the Russians.” Other users, such as Oleh (ID: 1620364***), spread detailed rumors that the police allegedly abandon positions at the front (“and at night they run away… bastards”), while 18-year-old volunteers are dying. This is intended to pit different units of the Defense Forces against each other and demoralize recruits.

3. Socio-economic apocalypse

Manipulation of economic hardship is another dimension of destabilization. Users paint a picture of total ruin. The actor teplotem (ID: 1239216***) creates an apocalyptic description: “All infrastructure is destroyed, schools are now only 9-year schools, roads are smashed… millions of people are blocked by the TRC like in the 60s… Therefore, only aliens can save us.”. The subject @toypower poses rhetorical questions that devalue the very concept of victory: “And did anyone promise victory? And what is victory? Importing migrants? Inability to pay pensions in the future? What is there to endure for?”. When the goal (victory) is stripped of meaning, the instrument for achieving it (mobilization, resistance) becomes illegitimate in the eyes of society.

Recruitment, coordination, and intelligence activity 

Analysis of the data proves that social networks in Ukraine have transformed from communication platforms into instruments of hybrid warfare. The radicalized environment is used by Russian special services for direct recruitment of agents, coordination of destructive actions, and collection of intelligence information in real time.

In the information space, accounts such as lugansk_24 or profiles with hidden offers of “side jobs” are regularly detected. These profiles target socially vulnerable groups of the population or radicalized youth, offering monetary rewards for carrying out tasks that harm national security (arson of relay cabinets on railways, vehicles of AFU/TRC servicemen, painting markings, etc.).

A characteristic example is the user @kris_talik_77 (ID: 770157***), who, during a discussion of explosions in Kyiv, suddenly posts an advertisement: “Guys, need 1 person for work, up to 25 years old, the job is not difficult, 1600 for 8 hours, DM me”. The condition “up to 25 years old” is extremely indicative: it targets persons not subject to compulsory mobilization and therefore able to move relatively freely around the city, bypassing checkpoints, which makes them ideal executors for sabotage acts. Financing of such activity is carried out through cryptocurrencies or anonymous payment systems.

There are also recorded facts of direct fundraising in support of occupation forces. For example, the actors @Lunay14 and @Lelyavyaz openly publish in chats the bank details of Russian banks (Sberbank, T-Bank) to collect funds for equipping “mobile air defense groups of the DPR” or “children of Donbas in the zone of the special military operation.” This indicates deep penetration of hostile agents into the Ukrainian information space and attempts to identify latent collaborators willing to support the enemy financially.

Passive intelligence and fire correction

An extremely high level of threat is posed by the activity of users who, during missile attacks or UAV raids, publish precise data on impacts, flight routes, or air defense deployment locations, thereby carrying out Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) for the enemy.

Actor / ID Nature of intelligence activity Security consequences
Nikolaevna (ID: 6160035***) “The Shahed went straight through the house. A hole on both sides. Horrible.”  Detailed description of damage, allowing the enemy to assess the effectiveness of a strike along a specific trajectory.
N P (ID: 7950959***) “Topolia, Quarter attention… Direct hit… Just now it hit”  Real-time correction of strikes, confirmation of hits even when official bodies maintain information silence.
@hoodr1chhh (ID: 974757***) “They’re hitting right from the front entrance at the Monobank building”  Providing precise geolocation references for objects or air defense operations.
Olezhyk (ID: 6545480***) “It fell in Zhulyany”  Localization of debris or drone crash sites near critical infrastructure objects (airport).
Rita (ID: 639046***) “This was in the morning at TPP-6… It’s no longer burning…”  Disclosure of the fire status at a critical energy facility, which may stimulate a repeat strike.

Some actors openly admit to deliberate fire correction. The subject IhorF.F (ID: 8166140***), commenting on TRC activity, cynically notes: “The funny thing is that they justify it by an announcement like it’s because the TRC is being bombed. I’m sitting there and guiding missiles there ☺️🤣🤣🤣 And they’re not marked on any map anyway🤣”. 

In addition, attempts are recorded to collect intelligence on air defense tactics. The user Uf…. (ID: 7865878***) systematically analyzes air defense operations in Dnipro, asking manipulative questions: “Why are they usually shot down within the city???” and noting the use of anti-aircraft missile systems: “In Dnipro today they used an air defense system right on the street to destroy drones at 16:01”. Such information allows Russian analysts to map blind spots and positional areas of Ukrainian air defense systems.

Level of societal security and forecasts

A thorough analysis of the data arrays of the KRONOS dynamics “TRASER” OSINT module in correlation with current sociological research makes it possible to form an objective assessment of the level of security of Ukrainian society as of mid-2026.

The conclusions are extremely alarming: Ukraine’s internal stability is in the state of greatest fragility since the start of the full-scale invasion. Society has found itself in the grip of dual pressure: on the one hand, the external existential threat from the Russian Federation; on the other, rapid internal disintegration fueled by a crisis of trust and masterfully staged IPSO.

  • Degradation of the state monopoly on violence. A secure society is based on the axiom that only the state has the right to the legitimate use of force. TRASER data demonstrate that a significant percentage of radicalized citizens no longer recognize this right in the state. Calls for the killing of police officers, TRC employees, judges, and officials, as well as mass public approval of those who have already committed such attacks (using grenades, knives), indicate that the psychological barrier to violence against representatives of authority has disappeared. This is a direct path to anarchy and local terrorism.
  • Success of hostile IPSO in eroding identity. The Russian information machine has achieved significant success in creating artificial fault lines. Antisemitic narratives demonizing the country’s leadership and xenophobic myths about the “replacement of Ukrainians by Indians and Africans” have become deeply rooted in the consciousness of marginalized segments of the population. These narratives effectively deactivate the will to resist by convincing citizens that their real enemy sits not in the Kremlin, but in Kyiv.
  • Transformation of the digital space into a theater of war. Social networks in Ukraine have definitively ceased to be a safe environment. They are a platform for the mass recruitment of saboteurs (through offers of shadow “side jobs”) and an extensive network of passive intelligence, where thousands of “useful idiots” or conscious traitors correct Russian missile and drone strikes in real time.
  • Prospects for “Maidan-3” and social explosions. As experts note, the Kremlin is maximally interested in inflaming internal confrontation, which could lead to chaos and a conditional “Maidan-3” in order to occupy new territories. Given the catastrophically low level of trust in Parliament (19%), the presence of millions of unregistered weapons in circulation, and the high degree of radicalization, the likelihood of spontaneous armed uprisings in response to harsh government actions (for example, during mobilization measures) is assessed as critically high. Public sentiment will continue to radicalize, reflecting global trends in the polarization of conflicts.

In summary, the current state of Ukrainian society requires an immediate revision of the internal security paradigm. Purely repressive methods of combating cyber threats or detaining individual spotters are a fight against symptoms. 

Neutralization of the threat is possible only through a comprehensive reconstruction of trust in state institutions, radical cleansing of the law enforcement and mobilization systems from corruption, as well as the introduction of an effective, proactive system of strategic communications capable not only of debunking fakes, but also of forming resilient, consolidating meanings for an exhausted nation.

Institute of Social Dynamics and Security KRONOS

In the investigation, OSINT tools and artificial intelligence were actively used, in particular the Gemini and Grok models. OSINT methods made it possible to collect and analyze open data from various sources, including social networks, public databases, and web resources. Gemini provided in-depth analysis of textual data, pattern detection, and forecasting, while Grok, created by xAI, was used to process complex queries and generate precise conclusions based on large volumes of information. The combination of these technologies made it possible to significantly accelerate the investigation process, improve the accuracy of the results obtained, and identify connections that might have remained unnoticed by traditional methods.