🇷🇺 1. RUSSIAN FEDERATION (RF MIC: «ROSTEC» / «ROSATOM»)
Annual volume~35,000 tonnes/year
📌 Overall analysis and supply volumes:
The military-industrial complex of the Russian Federation consumes approximately 35,000 tonnes of critical and rare-earth metals annually for the production of missile weapons, armored vehicles, and electronic warfare systems. As a result of the depletion of its own deposits, the Russian Federation is forced to cover 100% of the deficit in tantalum, 7N high-purity gallium, and beryllium through re-export routes. The main customs gateways are trade intermediaries in the UAE and Turkish logistics operators.
🚨 Strategic supply anomalies (3 anomalies):
An anomalous increase (+42%) in the export of high-purity 7N Gallium through Dubai (DMCC) is recorded for the production of GaN chips for the anti-jamming modules «Kometa-M» of Х-101 missiles and «Orlan-10» UAVs. A leak of beryllium bronzes from Kazakhstan's UMZ through the Orenburg border railway checkpoint has been identified for the aviation gyroscopes of Су-35С fighters. The redirection of Congolese tantalum concentrates from the Kivu deposits through Chinese beneficiation plants to the Solikamsk Magnesium Plant has also been recorded.
🚀 Armaments and deposit dependence:
The Х-101 and «Kalibr» cruise missiles require ~420 tonnes of special metals annually: tantalum from the Kivu mines (DRC), titanium sponge from Verkhnyaya Salda/Irshansk, and gallium from Bayan Obo (PRC). The Т-90М and Т-80БВМ tanks depend on German and Chinese 6N germanium single crystals for the «Sosna-U» thermal imaging sights, as well as Vietnamese tungsten (Nui Phao) for smelting sub-caliber armor-piercing cores for the «Svinets-2». Tungsten mining in Vietnam increased by +6%, which made it possible to offset the shortage of Ural ore.
⚖️ Logistics operators and entities for in-depth compliance audit:
The main customs corridors are the UAE (DMCC, 38% of supplies), the PRC (Zabaikalsk/Shanghai, 32%), Kazakhstan (KTZ/Almaty, 18%), and Turkey (Istanbul, 12%). For analysis by competent regulatory authorities, 18 legal entities with anomalous declaration indicators have been identified, including the Dubai-based Al-Rawa Trade FZE (a transit flow of 140 tonnes of tantalum and 7N gallium is recorded) and the Kazakhstan-based KazAsia Logistics LLP (routes of UMZ beryllium alloys toward Orenburg have been recorded).